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1. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of poverty is particularly acute in 
India. With 14% of the world’s population, we 
have the misfortune of having almost twice as 
large a share of the world’s poor. Indeed, as I 
shall presently underline, the question of poverty 
and its amelioration has been at the center of our 
concerns from the beginning of our planning 
efforts almost four decades ago. Little therefore 
can be said on it that some distinguished Indian 
economist has not already said. In some ways, 
therefore, to talk on the design of public policy 
for poverty to an Indian audience is to carry coal 
to Newcastle or. as the old saying goes, to teach 
your grandmother how to suck eggs. None- 
theless, I hope to provide a fresh perspective by 
putting the problem into an explicit analytical 
framework that permits alternative policy designs 
to be sharply defined and contrasted. I also in- 
tend to draw on international experience to put 
our efforts and problems into both historical and 
comparative perspectives. 
2. ALTERNATIVE POLICY DESIGNS: 
INDIRECT VERSUS DIRECT ROUTES 
It is possible, and perhaps even interesting, to 
speculate whether poverty would increase or 
diminish if governments followed a regime of 
laissez faire, letting poverty and all else take a 
natural course. Few will dispute however the 
proposition that, except in singular circum- 
stances, public policy should assist in accelerat- 
ing the amelioration of poverty.’ The key 
question relates rather to the appropriate 
design of such public policy. 
Economics trains us to think of ends and 
means, of targets and policy instruments. With 
the amelioration of poverty as the target, the 
policy instruments designed to achieve that target 
can be divided into two main classes: (i) the in- 
direct route, i.e., the use of resources to acceler- 
ate growth and thereby impact on the incomes 
and hence the living standards of the poor; and 
(ii) the direct route, i.e., the public provision of 
minimum-needs-oriented education, housing, 
nutritional supplements and health. and transfers 
to finance private expenditures on these and 
other components of the living standards of the 
poor. 
The primary distinction between the two 
approaches is between creating income (and 
hence consumption) and providing consumption 
(in kind or through doles). The latter necessarily 
involves redistribution between different groups 
unless the financing comes from external re- 
sources; the former need have no such compo- 
nent, though complementary policies to bias the 
creation of income towards the poor, which I dis- 
cuss below, will often involve redistributive 
elements. Indeed, within both approaches, the 
direct and the indirect, we can consider the ques- 
tion of “biasing” or “targeting” the policies in 
favor of the poor. Thus, the indirect growth- 
oriented route may be supplemented by policies 
facilitating borrowing and investment by the poor 
or by redistributive land reform, whereas the 
direct route may be explicitly targeted towards 
the poor via means tests or choice of health and 
nutritional programs that overwhelmingly benefit 
the poor.” 
The optimal policy design should generally in- 
volve a mix of these two approaches unless the 
“productivity” of either in achieving the target 
substantially dominates that of the other. Thus, 
for instance, if growth will concentrate increased 
incomes entirely among the non-poor and there 
*This is the text of the 12th Vikram Sarabhai Memorial 
Lecture, delivered in Ahmedabad on 28 August 1987. 
I have profited greatly from conversation with and 
comments from Surjit Bhalla, Anil Deolalikar. Atul 
Kohli, Paul Streeten, T. N. Srinivasan, K. Subbarao, 
K. Sundaram, Raaj Sah. and Suresh Tendulkar. I have 
taken the opportunity to draw extensively on an earlier 
treatment of some of these issues in my Michigan State 
University Distinguished Speakers Series Lecture 
(Bhagwati, 1985b) on Growth and Poverty. sharpening 
and extending, however. the analysis presented there 
and drawing more extensively on Indian experience. 
539 
540 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
is no upward mobility either, the relevant rate of 
return to the indirect route is zero. Indeed. if 
growth can be shown to be immiserizing to the 
poor, this return would be negative! In this 
event. the case for exclusive reliance on the 
direct route becomes overwhelming. with two 
critical and compelling provisos: first. that it 
should be shown that the factors, both economic 
and political, that constrain the effectiveness of 
the growth process in indirectly reducing poverty 
do not simultaneously and equally afflict the 
direct route and prevent it as well from effec- 
tively providing benefits to the poor; and second, 
that the neglect of the growth process. even if its 
indirect impact on poverty through increased in- 
comes for the poor is negligible or harmful. 
would impair in the long run the ability of the 
state to sustain the expenditures required to 
finance the more productive direct route, espe- 
cially in an economy with a growing population. 
In economic thinking and in economic policy, 
the pendulum can swing with astonishing regular- 
ity. In the 1950s and 1960s the growth-based in- 
direct route to attacking poverty was the more 
fashionable, though the direct route was both 
recognized and far from neglected. By the 1970s 
however, one could hear nothing but a gloomy 
refrain that the indirect route of growth was in- 
effective and. worse still, harmful to the poor, 
and only the direct route in the shape of a Basic 
Needs strategy was the answer. By the 1980s. the 
indirect route was restored to grace and seen in a 
more favorable light, the alarmist assertions of 
experience with it were being discredited, and 
the matching difficulties that attend on traveling 
the direct route were being increasingly 
appreciated. 
Before I proceed to an analysis of the lessons 
that we have learnt in consequence of this exten- 
sive debate, and what they suggest for Indian 
public policy on poverty, let me turn to two fal- 
lacies that have plagued this debate, making it 
captive to fractious and misplaced ideological 
confrontations. 
(a) Growth: Target or instrument? 
The first fallacy asserts that growth was a rival 
target to poverty rather than an instrument to 
ameliorate it. Indeed, in the 1970s it was 
commonplace to claim that we had been pre- 
occupied in the 1950s and 1960s with growth, 
rather than the alleviation of poverty, as our 
objective. This was the central theme of writings 
on developmental economics, originating with 
varying degrees of explicitness from international 
agencies such as the International Labor Organi- 
zation (ILO). 
Let me confess that this contention may be 
both true and false. I say this, not in the frolic 
spirit of my good friend, the philosopher Sidney 
Morgenbesser. On being asked by one of his 
radical students during the Cultural Revolution 
whether he thought that Chairman Mao was right 
in arguing that a proposition could be both true 
and false. he instantly replied: I do and I don’t. 
Rather. I wish to enter the cave& that developing 
countries form such a mosaic ranging from city 
states such as Hong Kong to subcontinents such 
as China, or from democracies such as India to 
dictatorships such as today’s Chile and yester- 
day’s Argentina. that almost everything is valid 
somewhere and almost nothing is true everv- 
where. I must confess that the enormity of this 
problem was brought home to me when I, com- 
ing from India with its population of over 750 
million. recently visited Barbados with a popu- 
lation of 250,000. Asked to talk at the Central 
Bank, I found myself in the Governor’s office on 
the top floor, only to realize that you could prac- 
tically look out over the island. There was evi- 
dently no sensible distinction here between 
partial- and general-equilibrium analysis! So, to 
shield myself, I reminded my audience of the 
famous Mao-Nasser story. On a visit to Peking. 
Nasser looked unhappy. Concerned. Mao in- 
quired what was wrong. Nasser answered: I am 
having trouble with my neighbors. the Israelis. 
How many are there, asked Mao. About two mil- 
lion, Nasser replied. Oh, said Mao, which hotel 
are they staying at? 
I have no doubt that somewhere growth be- 
came an objective in itself during the early post- 
war years. Indeed, it may well have in countries 
where elites identified GNP, and associated size 
of the national economy, with respectability and 
strength in the world economy and polity. But, in 
influential developmental planning circles3 GNP 
was simply regarded as an instrumental variable. 
which would enable one to impact on the ulti- 
mate and central objective of reducing poverty. 
In fact, in India, which was the focus of intel- 
lectual attention during the 1950s for several 
reasons, reduction of poverty was explicitly dis- 
cussed during the late 1950s and early 1960s 
as the object of our planning efforts. In the 
Planning Commission, where the great Indian 
planner Pitambar Pant headed the Per- 
spective Planning Division, work was begun at 
this time on this precise issue. How could we 
provide “minimum incomes” for meeting the 
basic needs of all? 
The objective being to provide such minimum 
incomes, or to ameliorate poverty, rapid growth 
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was decided upon as the principal instrumentality 
through which this objective could be im- 
plemented. Let me explain why we came to 
focus on growth as the central weapon in our 
assault on poverty. 
I can speak to the issue, as it happens, from the 
immediacy of personal experience. For I re- 
turned to India during 1961, to join the Indian 
Statistical Institute which had a small think tank 
attached to Pant’s Division in the Planning Com- 
mission. Having been brought in by Pant to work 
as his main economist, I turned immediately to 
the question of strategy for minimum incomes. I 
assembled such income distribution data as were 
then available for countries around the world, 
both functional and personal, to see if anything 
striking could be inferred about the relationship 
between the economic and political system and 
policies and the share of the bottom three or four 
deciles. You can imagine the quality of these data 
then, by looking at their quality now almost a 
quarter of a century later. Nor did we have then 
anything systematic on income distribution in the 
Soviet Union. And we had admittedly nothing on 
China which was an exotic reality, about to make 
its historical rendezvous with the Cultural 
Revolution, but already suggesting to the care- 
ful scholar that its economic claims were not 
to be taken at face value. 
The scanning of, and reflection on, the income 
distribution data suggested that there was no dra- 
matic alternative for raising the poor to minimum 
incomes except to increase the overall size of the 
pie. The intercountry differences in the share of 
the bottom deciles, where poverty was manifestly 
rampant, just did not seem substantial enough to 
suggest any alternative path. The strategy of 
rapid growth was therefore decided upon, in con- 
sequence of these considerations, as providing 
the only reliable way of making a sustained, 
rather than a one-shot, impact on poverty. 
I will presently discuss this strategy and its suc- 
cess or failure in some depth.J However, let me 
return to stress the theme that growth therefore 
was indisputably conceived to be an instrumental 
variable, not as an objective per se. It is not sur- 
prising therefore that the strange assertions to 
the contrary by institutions and intellectuals who 
belatedly turned to questions of poverty in the 
1970s have provoked many of us who were 
“present at the creation” to take the backward 
glance and then to turn again to stare coldly 
and with scorn at these nonsensical claims. 
Gilbert Etienne, the well-known sociologist- 
cum-economist, whose heretical and brilliant 
work on India’s Green Revolution I shall soon 
cite, has exclaimed: “The claim that development 
strategies in the 1950s and 1960s overemphasized 
growth and increases of the GNP at the cost of 
social progress is a surprising one! . . . Equally 
peculiar is the so-called discovery of the problem 
of poverty” (1982, pp. 194, 195). T. N. Srinivasan 
and B. S. Minhas, both of whom have worked 
with great distinction on questions of poverty and 
who followed me to join Pant’s think tank, have 
been even more critical. I am afraid that I have 
also been moved to write (1984) in a personal 
vein: “. . . on hearing the claim that poverty had 
only recently been discovered and elevated as 
a target of development, I fully expected to 
find that Chapter One of my 1966 volume on 
The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries 
would be titled Growth; behold my surprise 
when it turned out to be Poverty and Income 
Distribution!” 
(b) Growth and ideology: Pull-up versus 
trickle-down 
The more egregious fallacy, however, has been 
for several economists and ideologues to assume 
that the growth-oriented indirect route must 
necessarily be a conservative option. The more 
liberal and radical among them have therefore 
tended to rush to their computers and their pens 
each time any evidence suggests that the indirect 
route may be productive of results, seeking to 
discount and destroy any such inference. 
I have never quite understood this phen- 
omenon. For, the growth strategy was con- 
ceived by us at the start of our planned assault on 
poverty as an activist, interventionist strategy. 
The government was to be critically involved in 
raising internal and external savings, in guiding if 
not allocating investment, in growing faster so 
that we could bring gainful employment and 
increased incomes to more of the poor. Whether 
the policy framework we worked with in India to 
use the indirect growth-based approach was an 
appropriate one, and whether therefore this 
route was efficiently exploited, is a different but 
critical issue which I will presently address. 
Since, therefore, the growth strategy was an 
activist strategy for impacting on poverty, I have 
always preferred to call it the pull-up, rather than 
the trickle-down, strategy. The trickle-down 
phrase is reminiscent of “benign neglect” and its 
use in the first Reagan administration to 
accompany efforts at dismantling elements of the 
welfare state has imparted yet other conservative 
connotations to it. The pull-up phrase, on the 
other hand, correctly conveys a more radical 
interventionist image and the intellectual context 
in which it emerged was defined by the ethically- 
attractive objective of helping the poor. 
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Lest you think that words do not matter, 
remember your Orwell or the endless battle for 
the dominant ground between euphemisms and 
calling a spade a spade. My favorite example 
from economics is the business schools’ preferred 
use of the word “multinationals.” nudging your 
subconscious in the direction of multilateralism 
and hence evoking the image of a benign 
institution, and the radicals’ insistence on call- 
ing these international corporations “trans- 
nationals.” strongly suggesting transgression. 
3. THE INDIRECT, GROWTH-BASED 
ROUTE: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS 
Let me then turn to the experience with the in- 
direct, growth-based route. 
(a) Immiserizing growth? 
It should be conceded immediately that it is 
easy enough for economists to construct cases 
where growth will bypass or will even harm the 
poor. The pious know that affluence can impov- 
erish one’s soul; the economist need not be sur- 
prised that it can impoverish one’s neighbors too. 
In fact, in my early scientific work in the late 
1950s. I developed a theory of immiserizing 
growth which established the conditions which 
yielded a yet stronger possibility: growth would 
immiserize oneself.’ The precise demonstration 
concerned an economy where increased produc- 
tivity led to a sufficiently large deterioration in 
the terms of trade whose adverse effect out- 
weighed the primary gain from growth. Thus, 
imagine that extension work leads to farmers 
raising grain production but this, in turn, 
lowers the grain price so much that the farmers’ 
income falls instead of rising. 
As it happens, the paradox that affluence can 
immiserize oneself is possible to demonstrate 
even if the affluence comes from transfer pay- 
ments. Thus international trade theorists have 
examined conditions under which the recipient of 
aid may be immiserized rather than enriched, so 
that a gift horse turns out to be a Trojan horse 
instead.6 
Such self-immiserizing possibilities naturally 
require more stringent conditions than the possi- 
bility that your affluence causes my misery (even 
when envy is wholly absent). Thus, consider the 
scenario where the more affluent farmers adopt 
the new seeds, grain prices fall and the marginal 
farmers who have not adopted the new tech- 
niques find their stagnant output yielding less 
income in consequence. In such a situation, 
the green revolution immiserizes the poor and, 
the radicals would hope, may usher in the red 
revolution. 
It is not true that we were unaware of such pos- 
sibilities. that growth could be a disturbingly un- 
even process. But the key question was: what 
should this awareness imply for policy? Evi- 
dently. you would first need to assess both how 
such unacceptable outcomes would arise in your 
specific circumstances and the probability of their 
arising in practice. Next, the policy set would 
have to be augmented to include, in addition to 
growth, further suitable instruments to prevent 
these unpleasant outcomes. The former requires 
judgment, based on empirical assessment: the 
latter, the possibility of finding suitable and feas- 
ible policy instruments. 
Let me illustrate by reference to the possibility 
of immiserizing growth that I cited earlier. In the 
international context, my 1958 model of im- 
miserizing growth was widely considered rel- 
evant, including by the distinguished Ragnar 
Nurkse in his 1959 Wicksell Lectures, because of 
the generally shared empirical assessment 
that the export markets of the developing 
countries were extremely tight, implying that the 
terms of trade would deteriorate sharply as a con- 
sequence of growth in the developing countries. 
But this assessment, not validated by subsequent 
analysis and events, did not imply that growth 
policy had to be abandoned. Rather the growth 
policy had to be supplemented by an appropriate 
policy of import substitution, so that we would 
have what Nurkse called ‘*balanced growth.“’ 
At least in the Indian context, the view taken 
was that, in the long haul, such adverse possibili- 
ties could not be the probable, central result of 
expanding incomes for any sizable group of the 
poor, but that rather the process would pull up 
increasing numbers into gainful work. 
While, as I have remarked, the limited and 
sketchy income distribution data revealed little of 
any consequence on how to improve this pull-up 
process, there was awareness that the pull-up 
effect on poverty would improve, ceteris paribus. 
if institutional mechanisms uch as special credit 
facilities for the poor were developed, necessary 
land reforms were implemented, and the access 
of the scheduled and backward classes (which 
have disproportionate numbers among the poor) 
to the opportunities provided by a growing eco- 
nomy were enhanced through preferential 
schemes. Policy-induced pro-poor bias was thus 
to be introduced into the growth process, to 
offset and outweigh any bias in the opposite 
direction that the market, interacting with inher- 
ited political and social forces, may imply.’ The 
concern, therefore, was not with sustained im- 
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miserizing outcomes and how to cope with them 
but rather with the devising of policy instruments 
to bias the growth process towards greater effi- 
cacy of the pull-up effects. 
There was also a distinct component, in 
the strategy. of the direct route. in the public 
provision of services such as clean water. sanita- 
tion, health services and education. The 
primary thrust of the Indian strategy, however. 
was to rely on the indirect route. This decision re- 
flected the constraints imposed by the appalling 
dimensions of India’s poverty, and the democra- 
tic politics of the country, on our ability to 
finance a significant reliance instead on the direct 
route over a sustained period. Noting the former 
constraint on our planning and fiscal efforts, the 
famous Polish economist, Michal Kalecki. whose 
left-wing credentials were never in doubt, had re- 
marked during his visit to India in the early 
1960s: “the trouble with India is that there are 
too few exploiters and too many exploited.” 
(b) The efficacy of the growth strategy 
India was the focus of interest and attention in 
the 1950s; distinguished economists and intellec- 
tuals descended on it the way they do on China 
today. Our ideas were influential and came to be 
shared widely in the efforts by many developing 
countries to accelerate their growth rates. I have 
argued elsewhere (1984) that there was a definite 
optimism during the 1950s and 1960s both that 
growth could be rapid and that it would indeed 
Impact on poverty. But by the early 1970s and 
later, there were increasing claims that called the 
efficacy of this strategy into doubt. The criticisms 
took two different forms: (i) that growth was ir- 
relevant and poverty had increased regardless: 
a 1977 IL0 study (quoted by Etienne, 1982, 
p. 198) asserted that “The number of rural poor 
in Asia has increased and in many instances their 
standard of living has tended to fall. Perhaps, 
surprisingly, this has occurred irrespective of 
whether growth has been rapid or slow or agricul- 
ture has expanded swiftly or sluggishly”; and (ii) 
that growth had in fact accentuated poverty: it 
made the rich richer and the poor poorer; Ghose 
and Grifftn argued in 1979 that ‘*It is not lack of 
growth but its very occurrence that led to de- 
terioration in the conditions of the rural poor” 
(quoted by Etienne, 1982, p. 198). 
In assessing these claims of increasing immis- 
erization, or mere stagnation in living standards, 
of the poor, it is necessary to examine not just the 
evidence and its plausibility, but also whether 
there was indeed satisfactory growth for the pull- 
up strategy to work where it is alleged to have 
failed. I am persuaded that the evidence is far 
less alarming than what it is claimed, that where 
growth has been rapid it has impacted on pov- 
erty, that in the Indian case the growth strategy 
has produced inadequate results because the 
policy framework for producing growth has pro- 
duced inadequate growth in the first place. and 
hence that the Indian experience suggests lessons 
in favor of superior growth-producing policies 
rather than lessons against using the growth- 
based indirect route to affecting poverty. 
(i) International experience 
Let me first stress that countries such as South 
Korea and Taiwan, which have grown much fas- 
ter than us in the postwar period to date, have 
had a substantial impact on their living standards. 
To see the force of the argument, that India’s 
poor growth performance has affected its pros- 
pects for raising living standards, it it useful to 
understand the force of compound interest. “Had 
India’s GDP grown as rapidly from 1960 to 1980 
as South Korea’s, it would stand at $531 billion 
today rather than $150 billion - surpassing that 
of the UK. equal to that of France, and more 
than twice that of China. India’s per capita in- 
come would have been $740 instead of $260; even 
with the benefits of growth inequitably distri- 
buted. it is not unreasonable to believe that most 
of the poor would have been substantially better 
~ff.“~ I shall, therefore, return to the question of 
our policy framework for promoting growth, 
especially as the moves towards a New Economic 
Policy were designed to remedy the deficiencies 
which afflicted that framework. 
(ii) Indian experience 
But, even with the relatively dismal growth 
rate we have had, the evidence is more compel- 
ling that some dent has been made on poverty 
than the doom-and-gloom analysts have often 
suggested. 
The evidence of the National Sample Surveys 
of consumption is an important source of infor- 
mation here. So are household income and other 
surveys. Before I sketch what these imply. it is 
pertinent to remark that many non-economist 
observers have been skeptical of the reliability of 
this type of evidence. Distinguished social and 
economic anthropologists uch as M.N. Srinivas, 
Louis Dumont and Polly Hill have remarked. 
with varying degrees of candidness, on the qual- 
ity of Indian data on the subject: and. mind you, 
these are generally regarded as possibly the best 
statistics in the developing world. The concepts 
are inadequate; the implementation yet poorer. 
Polly Hill (1984, p. 495) has written in frustration 
and with evident exaggeration that, India’s pride, 
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-*the All-India National Sample survey is perhaps 
the most remarkable example of wasted statisti- 
cal effort in the entire world!” Srinivas has com- 
plained of the brilliant mathematical statisticians 
who devise and direct the massive questionnaires 
to be filled out by field investigators that “This 
kind of study cannot be left to the hit and run 
method of an inferior class of investigators who 
commute from the cities to nearby villages.” It is 
not entirely unreasonable therefore to rely, at 
least for an alternative view of the matter, on the 
results from the “naked eye” anthropological- 
cum-longitudinal approach to make the required 
inferences. 
Here, I must confess that I have been much im- 
pressed by the analysis of Gilbert Etienne (1982), 
who has argued convincingly from firsthand evi- 
dence from extended stays in a number of Indian 
villages, which he surveyed earlier, that poverty 
has indeed been impacted on, and that too where 
agricultural growth has occurred. Etienne’s tech- 
nique is to do what I call “doing in India what you 
do in China,” i.e., disregard the numbers (which 
in any case are not available in a reliable fashion 
for China which has only recently opened itself to 
a measured degree of external and internal scru- 
tiny and independent analysis) and carefully 
assess what you see. He has gone back over time 
to several villages that he had looked at inten- 
sively, often more than a decade earlier. And he 
observes, asks, examines, and records: much like 
Jan Myrdal (1966) in his celebrated Report from 
Liu Ling but with more anthropological, socio- 
logical and economic discipline and less poetry. 
The results are what we did expect: growth has 
indeed pushed several of the poor on in life. 
Doubtless, some poor have been left behind; 
others have been impoverished even further. But 
then, as Arthur Lewis has wisely remarked, it is 
inherent in the developmental process that some 
see the opportunities and ‘seize them, leaving 
others behind until they wish to and can follow. 
Politics and economics can both constrain the 
capacity of the laggards to follow. Thus, for in- 
stance, the green revolution in some instances 
may well have polarized the distribution of prop- 
erty in the countryside, enriching the farmers 
with access to credit, fertilizers and irrigation and 
immiserizing those who did not. But, if Etienne is 
correct, this has not happened in anything like a 
significant degree in his cross-section of villages 
in India. Of course, what Etienne observes may 
be true only for “his villages.” But his unscientific 
sample is compensated in some degree by the 
closer scrutiny and care that the scientific surveys 
evidently do not possess. What do the latter 
show? 
As it happens, even the statistical evidence 
from these surveys is corroborative, if not wholly 
conclusive. of the fact that the proportion of the 
poor below an accepted poverty line has 
diminished and strongly suggestive of the hy- 
pothesis that growth has been a proximate cause 
of the reduction in poverty. 
The recently published estimates of a team 
headed by B. S. Minhas, who has distinguished 
himself for pioneering work on estimating pov- 
erty along with other noted economists such as 
Dandekar and Rath (1971), are perhaps the most 
carefully constructed sets of poverty statistics on 
the subject.‘” They utilize new consumer prices 
for updating the base-year poverty lines and 
reexamine the recent calculations of the Planning 
Commission which had suggested a dramatic 
decrease in the proportion of the poor in the 
last decade.” It is noteworthy that, while their 
calculations reduce the degree of improvement 
estimated by the Planning Commission, they 
conclude that “The incidence of poverty in 1983 
in terms of proportion of people below the pov- 
erty line was substantially lower than the corres- 
ponding estimates for the 1970s” (Minhas et al., 
1987, p. 47). though there is no evidence of a fall 
in the absolute numbers below the poverty line 
and, if anything, there may be a small rise in 
these numbers, reflecting of course the dual 
pressure and double squeeze of a low growth rate 
and a rising population. 
Again, I must note that Minhas’s early work 
(1970; 1971) had drawn attention to the fact that 
the incidence of poverty goes down in years of 
good harvests and up in years of bad harvests. 
This phenomenon is reconfirmed in his recent 
estimates (Minhas et al., 1987). 
My distinguished former student, K. Sun- 
daram of the Delhi School of Economics, who 
has done notable work with Suresh Tendulkar 
(1983a, 1983b. 1983~) on the poverty problem, 
has correctly reminded us (1986) that this rela- 
tionship requires us to be cautious in inferring 
any trend in decline of the poverty ratio from the 
two observations for 1977-78 and 1983 on whose 
basis we have had to work as far as the estimates 
based on the NSS Consumer Expenditure Sur- 
veys are c0ncerned.i’ The poverty ratio has fluc- 
tuated sharply with agricultural production and 
the time-series evidence suggests that no trend 
should be inferred unless more data points are 
available: the two pleasant observations may 
simply be reflective of good harvests rather 
than a better trend. 
But this very critique or cautious reminder 
implies that indeed, as Minhas had noted, 
there is some evidence for the favorable impact 
of growth on poverty, at least in the rural sector 
where 80% of the poor are to be found. 
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In fact. Montek Ahluwalia’s classic 1978 paper 
on rural poverty and agricultural performance 
had analyzed all-India time series data to under- 
line this precise link. This work has also pro- 
voked controversy, with the radical response 
being provided by Saith (1981) who has drawn 
the opposite conclusions while working with the 
same data set. Careful analysis of the two papers 
by Subodh Mathur (1985). examining both the 
econometrics and the economics of the issue, 
reaches the conclusion that “aggregate all-India 
data support Ahluwalia’s contention that agricul- 
tural growth reduces poverty.” 
However, Srinivasan (1985). who has raised 
several compelling objections to the econometric 
procedures and inferences in Saith’s analysis, 
also cautions that Ahluwalia’s results, which are 
only confirmed by inclusion of additional data 
which have become available since 1978 (Ahlu- 
walia, 1985), should not be treated as a decisive 
test of the pull-up hypothesis. For, the data show 
that “there was no upward trend in net domestic 
product of agriculture per head of rural popula- 
tion - there was very little to trickle-down at the 
all-India level.” Discussing also the related work 
by Bardhan (1982). utilizing some state-level 
data of still less reliability, Srinivasan has con- 
cluded that meaningful tests with more and 
better longitudinal data than have been avail- 
able are necessary, by regions or areas differen- 
tiated by high and low growth rates. before 
firm conclusions can be drawn on the issue. 
But the existing analyses do favor the presum- 
ption, for the present, that the effect of growth 
is to reduce, rather than to bypass or exacer- 
bate. poverty. 
Other sources of evidence also suggest that, 
while poverty remains appalling in its dimen- 
sions, it has diminished at least as a proportion of 
the population. Thus, a careful examination of 
the estimates of income distribution for India by 
Bhalla and Vashishtha (1985) concludes that 
household income surveys (as distinct from 
NSS-surveys-based estimates discussed above) 
indicate that if households are ranked by per 
capita incomes, neither the bottom 20% nor the 
bottom 40% exhibit any significant change in 
their share of income between 1964-65 and 1975- 
76. At the same time, of course, per capita in- 
come had increased, so that a constant share 
would imply a higher absolute level, indicating a 
decline in poverty. Again, however, these sur- 
veys suffer from serious difficulties of compar- 
ability, arising from differences in definitions 
and coverage. Comparable data sets relate 
only to 1970-71 and 1975-76 for the large rural 
sector: and these indicate favorable conclusions 
again. 
Furthermore. the two recent NCAER longitu- 
dinal. nationwide surveys of identical households 
for 1970-71 and 1981-82 have suggested that. 
even in the lowest three deciles. there has been a 
significant rise of households across the poverty 
line. The proportions who did so are as high as 
46%. 41% and 54% for the lowest, the second- 
lowest and the next deciles. The results are in- 
deed remarkable, suggesting both that poverty 
can be impacted and that it has been. Again. 
however, trends cannot be inferred from two 
observations; and there are problems, noted by 
Dr Sundaram (1986. pp. 21-28). with the sample 
size relating to the poor households and with the 
fact that there is no way one can infer whether 
the households changed their fortunes due to in- 
creased productivity and income or due to 
demographic factors. But. when all this is 
noted, the fact remains that these surveys yield 
results that do not provide support for the hy- 
pothesis of stagnation or immiseritation in the 
living standards of the poor. 
(iii) Gron,tlr and the New Economic Policy 
If then much of this evidence, with all warts 
duly registered. suggests ome success in assault- 
ing poverty, and this too with only our limited 
success in enhancing growth, the key question 
rather becomes: why has our growth been so 
disappointing? 
Our record of growth is admittedly one of 
acceleration over the pre-Independence period 
and compares well with that of countries in the 
19th century. But we need to remember that this 
is the case with most of the developing countries 
in the postwar period and that, compared to 
them, we appear as unfortunate laggards. 
In fact. most of us were pleasantly surprised, 
despite our optimism, at the remarkable growth 
rates turned up by the developing countries after 
World War II. The reasons are probably self- 
evident. Whereas the pre-Industrial Revolution 
growth rates were dependent largely on capital 
accumulation, they increased in the post- 
Industrial Revolution period because of un- 
precedented technical change. The developing 
countries, by contrast, could combine increasing 
rates of external and internal savings with influx 
of off-the-shelf technology and thus grow very 
rapidly. Many did. 
The productivity of the increased rates of in- 
vestment has, however, varied, depending on the 
policy framework within which the economy op- 
erated. There is sufficient evidence, in my judg- 
ment, that our policy framework degenerated by 
the early 1960s on critical fronts, confining us to a 
trend growth rate of roughly 3.5% per annum or 
about 1.5% per capita growth rate annually.13 
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Despite an almost three-quarters increase in 
our fixed investment rate over the period 1950- 
84. we had little improvement in the growth rate. 
If we break the period into 1951 to 1965 (coincid- 
ing roughly with the Nehru and pre-wheat- 
revolution era) and 1968 to 1984 (omitting the 
two severe drought years of 1965-66 and 1966- 
67), the trend growth rate is 3.88% in the former 
period and 3.75% in the latter, there being no 
statistically significant difference between the 
two rates (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 198-l). The 
decadal average growth rate of the 1950s 
(3.59%), 1960s (3.13%) and 1970s (3.62%) are 
also similar. Evidently, we got our policy frame- 
work wrong. 
Economic analysis is often unable to detect 
unique causes of the phenomena being ex- 
plained. In this instance as well, the contributory 
factors are by no means the only two I shall cite; 
but they are certainly among the most import- 
ant.” The first relates to the excessive and explo- 
sive growth of controls over industry and foreign 
trade until the most recent changes; the second 
concerns the failure to exploit the advantage of 
foreign trade. 
The growth of controls turned our governmen- 
tal intervention, so necessary in a developing 
country, into a counterproductive one. A govern- 
ment of “don’ts” will stifle initiative; it will also 
divert entrepreneurial energies into a number of 
wasteful rent-seeking and other directly unpro- 
ductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities. By con- 
trast, a government of “do’s,” such as the one 
which the successful countries of the Far East 
have had, is likely to harness its people’s energies 
more productively, even if its prescriptions are 
mistaken from time to time. It is an increasing 
appreciation of these questions, and the sense 
that our Kafkaesque maze of controls could not 
possibly be sensible, that led me and others dur- 
ing the late 1960s and recently many others still, 
to call for a progressive dismantling of this mon- 
strous constraint on our economic efforts. I may 
remind you in particular that I. G. Patel, who 
oversaw our economic policy with distinction for 
much of this period, recently took the occasion of 
the Kingsley Martin Memorial Lecture to join us 
in our corner and ask dramatically for a “bonfire” 
of the industrial licensing system.” 
As for the inability we have exhibited in ex- 
ploiting the gains from trade in a world economy 
that grew at unprecedented rates in the 1950s and 
1960s and which still continues to absorb rapidly 
expanding exports from the developing coun- 
tries, the explanation lies in what social scientists 
call the “self-fulfilling prophecy.” Despite all evi- 
dence to the contrary, our planning and policy 
framework was continually based on what eco- 
nomists call “export pessimism.” The failure to 
use the exchange rate actively to encourage ex- 
ports as in other countries. the inflexibilities (in- 
troduced by the pervasive controls) which must 
handicap the ability to penetrate and hold 
fiercely competitive foreign markets, the pro- 
tection and hence attractiveness of the home 
market: these policies produced a dismal export 
performance. while other successful countries 
expanded their exports ra idly and gained in 
P economic growth greatly. 6 How dismal our 
export performance has been can. in fact, 
be understood readily by noting that our share in 
world exports was only 0.41% by 1981, having 
fallen almost continually since 1948 when it was 
2.4%. This certainly affected even our industrial 
sector’s growth. For, other countries which 
began with a much smaller industrial base are not 
only exporting more manufactures than India 
but, what is more striking, catching up with India 
in the absolute size of their manufacturing sector. 
The size of Korea’s manufacturing sector, for 
example, was less than 25% of India’s in 1970 
(measured as value-added). By 1981. it was 
already up to 60%. Korea’s manufactured ex- 
ports, negligible in 1962, amounted by 1980 to 
nearly four times those of India’s!” Simply put, 
we missed the bus. 
I agree that we could not have grown as fast as 
the Far Eastern economies, the Gang of Four (as 
I christened them with success many years ago) 
or the Four Tigers, because we had a much larger 
agricultural base. Our agriculture, I agree again 
with Professors Dantwala (1970) and Srinivasan 
(1982) among others, grew about as fast as could 
be expected and charges of its neglect are se- 
riously exaggerated. ” But to infer from this that 
India could not have grown much faster than it 
did is to forget again the force of compound 
arithmetic: non-agricultural growth, in an eco- 
nomy geared to rapidly expanding trade and non- 
agricultural production, would have provided a 
growing impetus to the economy, steadily over- 
whelming the agricultural sector’s importance in 
both value-added and employment. 
How would such a shift to an export-promoting 
strategy have affected the pull-up process of 
creating more gainful employment? The pro- 
ponents of the import-substituting strategy, on 
which we continued to place total reliance in- 
stead, have suggested that the export-promoting 
strategy would have been less productive of em- 
ployment, even if it may have produced more 
efficiency. Quite aside from the fact that the 
empirical evidence suggests that the export 
promoting strategy implies in practice faster 
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growth and impact on poverty, there is yet 
further evidence that, even in the short run, ex- 
port promotion has been associated with more 
labor-intensive investment and production. I 
refer here to the important findings of Pro- 
fessor Anne Krueger (1983) and her associates 
in her major three-volume study of this sub- 
ject. The export-promoting strategy has not 
merely led to more rapid income growth but also 
produced greater increase in demand for labor. 
cereris paribus. A major reason is the labor- 
intensiveness of export industries in the export- 
strategy-led countries. 
(v) Growth and political economy constraints 
Why did these serious deficiencies afflict our 
planning efforts? The question belongs to the 
new field of political economy. In particular. my 
theory of the causes and consequences of pro- 
liferation controls is that initially they were the 
product of ideas and ideology, then they led to 
the growth of interests, and now as the ideas 
and ideology have shifted these interests pose a 
critical obstacle to the desired shift of strategy. 
At the outset, few of us realized that controls 
could proliferate in the way they did. In the early 
1950s industrial controls appeared to be sensible 
instruments, to allocate resources in directions 
worked out in the Planning Commission. Indus- 
trial licensing would eliminate excess capacity 
by regulating entry; scarce resources would be 
channeled in optimal directions. Pretty soon, 
however, the promotional agencies such as the 
DGTD had largely turned into restrictive and 
regulatory agencies instead; and in no time we 
were operating in a regime where one could not 
even exceed licensed capacity or diversify pro- 
duction lines in any way without retribution. A 
straitjacket had evolved from what seemed 
like a reasonable economic approach to invest- 
ment allocation. 
This economic regime spawned its own in- 
terests. The rentier society it yielded, with entre- 
preneurs enjoying squatters’ rights, created a 
business class that wanted liberalization in the 
sense of less hassle, not genuine competition. 
The bureaucrats, however idealistic at the outset, 
could not but have noticed that this regime gave 
them the enormous power that the ability to ccn- 
fer rents generates. The politics of corruption 
also followed as politicians became addicted to 
the use of licensing to generate illegal funds for 
elections, and then for themselves. The iron 
triangle of businessmen, bureaucrats and politi- 
cians was born around the regime that econom- 
ists and likeminded ideologues had unwittingly 
espoused. 
As ideas have now changed, through the pro- 
cess of “learning by undoing,” these interests 
now stand in the way of rapid, if any, change. 
While the erstwhile partnership of the Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the then Finance 
Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh was appar- 
ently determined to take the necessary steps to 
start on a program of removing the straitjacket 
on the Indian economy, and their leadership was 
evidently of great importance in defining sharply 
a promise of new policies, the hesitations and ob- 
stacles from both the intellectuals of the older 
vintage and the interests of the iron triangle have 
been manifest, raising acutely the question 
whether the early momentum for change can be 
politically maintained.lY 
(vi) Pro-poor-bias policies and political economy 
constraints 
I am afraid that the pro-poor-bias policies have 
equally run into difficulties, arising from unequal 
asset distribution and hence unequal political 
power at the grassroots level. The degree of suc- 
cess of policies aimed at improving the pull-up 
effects of the growth process is evidently a func- 
tion of the extent to which ‘countervailing 
power” is available to the poor through the 
presence of social action groups and politi- 
cally viable proposition parties- 
Here again, however, I should like to empha- 
size that, in the longer run, substantial growth 
itself is a factor generating the necessary counter- 
vailing power through the marketplace, by rais- 
ing the demand for labor and increasing its 
opportunity cost. I hypothesize that the relative 
success of tenancy reform in Gujerat must have 
also some relationship to the fact that many of 
those who “lost their lands” to it had little incen- 
tive to fight and evade the reform in view of the 
fact that they already had shifted to urban careers 
and the transaction costs of the efforts at evasion 
were in consequence just too high. 
(vii) Radical restructuring: Why not? 
Let me add some remarks about radical re- 
structuring of the asset structure and transition to 
fuller socialism d la China and Cuba as possible 
alternatives to our policies for creating a sus- 
tained impact on poverty. 
I am afraid that the skepticism that marked the 
enthusiasm for the Chinese experiment appears 
to have only been reinforced by later develop- 
ments. In the 1950s it was often thought that, if 
only a Chinese revolution could be ushered into 
the developing countries, its triumphs in elimi- 
nating poverty could be replicated. The skeptic- 
ism lingered because systematic scrutiny of the 
Chinese claims was not possible; and one legiti- 
mately wondered whether absolute poverty had 
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truly been reduced and also whether growth’ 
could be sustained within the new framework. 
raising questions about the sustainability of the 
immediate impact on poverty. Now. atter the 
window has steadily opened wider in the after- 
math of the Cultural Revolution and the failures 
of the Great Leap Forward, we are not sure 
at all. 
We know now that the barefoot doctors gen- 
erally wore shoes: that their professional com- 
petence occasionally exceeded only marginally 
that of the average grandmother: and that 
doctors have dragged their feet almost as success- 
fully as elsewhere when assigned to go to the 
country-side, indeed to the point where Liu- 
shao-chi’s major crimes were declared by the 
Red Guards and official pronouncements to 
include sabotage of the campaign to carry doctors 
to the rural areas. We are further told that the 
Chinese concept of equality was intra-commune, 
not between communes: the rich communes did 
not generally share their affluence with the desti- 
tute ones. And we are now told by the new 
regime that more than 10% of the Chinese popu- 
lation may be below a rather austere poverty 
line. 
These tantalizing glimpses into China’s assault 
on poverty will almost certainly not be allowed 
to develop into a fuller picture as in other de- 
veloping countries, since careful and unfettered 
scholarly scrutiny is unlikely to be possible in the 
degree necessary. I am afraid therefore that 
we shall have to reconcile ourselves to the un- 
comfortable situation where we do not know for 
certain the extent to which China’s ex ante 
egalitarian methods failed ex posr. and whether 
the failures were due to discordance between 
their announced and their true objectives or 
rather due to the limitations of the methods used 
to achieve the announced objectives. 
(viii) Equitable asset distribution 
On the other hand, the proposition that a more 
equitable distribution of assets at the start of the 
growth process will generally imply that the new 
incomes will, in turn. be distributed better is of 
course quite plausible. In the end, over a longer 
period, the forces that generate inequality will 
tend to unequalize the outcomes. But over a 
generation or two, the net outcomes would be 
more equal than if we were to start with unequal 
distribution of assets. The experience of South 
Korea and Taiwan, where Japanese occupation is 
largely credited with having brought about the in- 
itial asset-ownership equalization, underlines this 
near-truism well. Also the experience in India, 
where several micro-level studies have shown the 
link between asset-ownership and new-income 
distribution to be a significant factor in a fair 
number of cases. only underlines the wisdom of 
supplementing the growth-oriented approach 
with policy measures that counter this bias (Ten- 
dulkar, 1983). 
A policy of “redistribution with growth.” 
where the redistribution of assets precedes the 
growth that is designed to impact on poverty, has 
therefore been advocated by several disting- 
uished economists.” If such redistribution can be 
undertaken politically, and its implementation is 
not disruptive economically (as was the case with 
Soviet collectivization).” we can only rejoice. 
(ix) From income to consumption 
We also face, even when incomes have reached 
the poor, a final set of dilemmas. 
First, as the sociologists of povertv have long 
known, the poor may spend their incomes on 
frills rather than on food. As the Japanese 
proverb goes: each worm to his taste: some pre- 
fer nettles. Perhaps you have heard of the sea- 
men’s folklore which recounts the story of the 
sailor who inherited a fortune, spent a third on 
women, a third on gin, and -*frittered away” the 
rest. 
In fact, there is now considerable econometric 
evidence, reviewed splendidly by Behrman and 
Deolalikar (1987~). that supports the common 
sense view that increases in income do not auto- 
matically result in nutritional improvement even 
for very poor and malnourished populations.‘” 
Their high income elasticities of expenditure on 
food reflect a strong demand for the non- 
nutritive attributes of food (such as taste. aroma. 
status and variety), suggesting strongly that in- 
come generation will not automatically translate 
into better nutrition. 
For those of us who feel that certain basic 
needs ought to be satisfied. this tragic assertion 
of what economists have come to call rather 
extravagantly “consumer sovereignty” leaves us 
confronting a familiar moral-philosophical issue. 
Should we actively intervene so that the poor are 
seduced into better fulfillment of what vve regard 
as their basic needs? I do. In fact, I see great vir- 
tue in quasi-paternalistic moves to induce, by 
supply and taste-shifting policy measures. more 
nutrient food intake, greater use of clean water, 
among other things, by the poor. In thus com- 
promising the principle of unimpeded and unin- 
fluenced choice, for the poor and not for others. 
evidently I adopt the moral-philosophical posi- 
tion that I do not care if the rich are mal- 
nourished from feeding on too many cakes but do 
if the poor are malnourished from buying too 
little bread, when their incomes can buy them 
both proper nourishment if only they were to 
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choose to do so. In this, I am in the ethical 
company of Sofya (Sonia) Marmeladova in 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment who, in 
turning to prostitution to support her destitute 
mother, sacrifices virtue for a greater good. 
(x) Whose consumption: Gender et al. 
Next. in addition to the first, is the other 
dilemma: that even when households have con- 
sumed what is desirable and adequate on a per 
capita basis, its distribution within the household 
may be such as to deprive the weaker members, 
such as females, of an adequate access to the con- 
sumption basket. In the 1970s I was somewhat 
isolated (Bhagwati. 1973) as an economist in 
being seriously interested in the sex-bias that was 
visible in the statistics on educational enroll- 
ments, literacy, infant mortality and nutritional 
levels, much of the evidence coming from anthro- 
pological findings and other surveys.“’ 
Now, almost a decade later, many others have 
followed and are actively analyzing the problem 
so that we now know more, though not enough, 
about this key component of our problems in im- 
proving living standards. Among the important 
findings, I should note the Behrman and Deolali- 
kar (1987b) result that the intra-household discri- 
mination may not merely be in the form of lower 
quantities of food/nutrients allocated to weaker 
members such as females, but may also occur in 
the form of greater fluctuations in the quantities 
allocated to them in response to adverse food 
price changes. 
Additional policy instruments are evidently 
necessary to offset this bias if the elimination of 
poverty is to occur more rapidly and equitably. 
The task here is clearly harder than simply 
generating more income; and progress in the 
matter may have to depend on the spread of edu- 
cation in the first place. 
4. THE DIRECT ROUTE: EXPERIENCE 
AND LESSONS 
What then have we learnt about the direct 
route, its efficacy and productivity? 
It is important to enter the caveat immediately 
that the key issue is not whether this route pro- 
duces results but rather its productivity relative 
to that of the indirect route. It would be asto- 
nishing indeed if greater public health expendi- 
tures or direct income transfers did not produce 
some improvement in the living standards of the 
poor, even though it is not beyond the ingenuity 
of economists to produce paradoxes of immiser- 
ization in this area as well.zs 
(a) Eating your cake and having it too 
At the outset, it is worth noting that there are 
significant externalities for growth itself from ex- 
penditures on publicly provided services. Many 
of us have been surprised, though pleasantly this 
time, by the realization that we had exaggerated 
our early fears about the trade-off between “con- 
sumption” expenditures (such as financing edu- 
cation and health) and investment expenditures 
aimed at growth and hence ultimate impact on 
poverty. It is difficult today to appreciate the 
widespread notion in the 1950s that primary edu- 
cation was simply a “natural right,” whose imple- 
mentation reflected the availability of resources. 
That it was possibly an important means for rais- 
ing productivity and hence growth and therefore 
reducing poverty, and that it could therefore be 
justified also on consequentialist ethics, was a 
later phenomenon. This holds equally for health 
expenditures which were viewed with inhibited 
enthusiasm also for fear that they would exacer- 
bate population growth. Only later were they 
considered to have a possible productivity- 
enchancing effect on populations that could 
otherwise be working at impaired efficiency or 
even to lead to a lowering of the birth rates if, by 
reducing infant mortality and increasing survival 
rates, they enabled parents to produce fewer 
babies to wind up with their target family size in a 
steady state. 
Much of the currently available indirect or 
“macro” evidence on this issue has recently been 
ably reviewed by Bela Balassa (1983). Thus, for 
instance, Correa (1970) has argued that improve- 
ments in health (proxied by reductions in death 
rates and in work days lost) and nutrition 
(measured as increases in calorie intake) added 
0.12 to 0.93 percentage points. and improve- 
ments in education (measured as the average 
level of education of the working force) added 
0.05 to 0.53 percentage points to the rate of eco- 
nomic growth in nine Latin American countries 
during 1950-62. Again, Norman Hicks (1980) 
has estimated that a lo-year increase in life 
expectancy raises per capita GDP growth rates 
by 1.1 percentage points and a 10 percentage 
point increase in literacy rates by 0.3 percentage 
points. 
But, of course, health and education expendi- 
tures affect growth and the other way around. 
Simple regressions therefore can be misleading 
and simultaneous estimation is necessary. David 
Wheeler (1980) and Robin Marris (1982) have 
done precisely this, the former for 88 developing 
countries for 1960-73 and 1970-73 as well as 
pooled data for the whole period, the latter for 37 
middle-income and 29 low-income countries for 
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1965-73 and for 1973-78. Wheeler’s findings in- 
dicate significant impact on growth rates from in- 
creases in calorie intake and in literacv rates. 
Marris’s study found that primary education en- 
rollments had a favorable effect on growth rates 
of per capita income whereas increased life ex- 
pectancy and family planning helped through re- 
ductions in the rate of growth of population 
(Balassa, 1983, pp. 10-11). 
But more compelling is the direct, “micro” evi- 
dence linking health. in particular, to productiv- 
ity. I should note here the recent econometric 
work on Indian data by Deolalikar (1988), 
though there is by now a substantial literature 
that analyzes the issue both theoretically and 
econometrically. 
More is known now, therefore, to wean us 
away from the fear that such educational and 
health expenditures are necessarily at the ex- 
pense of growth. What is equally pleasurable is 
the fact that many of these arguments apply with 
yet greater force when the expenditures are 
addressed to the poorer segments of the popula- 
tion. The case for undertaking more such ex- 
penditures, with focus on the poor, consistent 
with being engrossed in the growth strategy, is 
therefore now seen to be stronger than ever 
before.” I think we have learnt that, within 
reasonable margins, we may then be able to eat 
our cake and have it too. Social expenditures 
could improve the welfare of the poor directly 
and also indirectly through growth which in turn 
would impact on poverty. But beyond these 
margins, the trade-off remains an issue. 
(b) Political economy constraints 
At the same time, as Lakdawala (1986) has re- 
cently emphasized, income expansion itself can 
be a precondition for utilization of the publicly- 
provided services. For, such income can “take 
care of the incidental expenditure incurred in 
using these facilities” (p. 392).” 
In fact, this observation underlines the fact 
that the political economy factors that have 
prompted and also constrained the measures to 
offset the anti-poor biases in the growth-based in- 
direct route are unlikely to disappear when we 
turn to the direct route. Thus, nutrition programs 
through schools go to those who attend schools 
and therefore will not seriously impact on the 
poor whose children do not get to school: a 
phenomenon noted by researchers in the 1970s 
already. The successful impartation of a pro-poor 
bias in direct expenditures for living standards 
improvement is, in our experience, likely there- 
fore to face difficulties somewhat parallel to 
those faced in the pursuit of the pro-poor-bias 
policies in the indirect. growth-based route.” In 
the 1970s. when the indirect growth-based 
route’s productivity was being significantly 
understated in the international discussions, as I 
have already argued. the productivity of the 
direct route was being overstated by ignoring 
the political-economy constraints that afflict the 
latter as well. 
Overstated productivity? 
The productivity of the direct route may have 
been overstated also through an overly-optimistic 
inference from two allegedly outstanding success 
stories widely cited in this literature: Sri Lanka 
and Cost Rica. 
As it happens, however, a brilliant analysis of 
Sri Lanka by Bhalla (1985a. 1985b) and then by 
Bhalia and Glewwe (1985, 1986) has called this 
story into question. Apparently Sri Lanka’s claim 
to attention consisted in substantial direct ex- 
penditures and also splendid performance on in- 
dices such as literacy, life expectancy and infant 
mortality rates which were then assumed to be 
a result of these direct expenditures. But these 
indicators were already remarkably high bv 1948 
itself: a fact that was not allowed for in the 
argumentation which relied astonishingly on 
single-time-period cross-country comparisons.‘” 
When changes in these indices are considered for 
1960-78, it turns out that Sri Lanka’s perform- 
ance on these criteria shrinks into mediocrity. Of 
six indicators analyzed, for only two - life ex- 
pectancy and the death rate-does Sri Lanka do 
better than average; and, if a strict statistical test 
is used, only the death rate survives to fit this bill. 
With this reversal of conclusions based on 
changes in, rather than on levels of, the perform- 
ance indicator,” the question arises whether the 
few performance of Sri Lanka in this recent post- 
war period reflects low growth rates. reinforcing 
exactly the opposite conclusion to what is pre- 
sumably being contended! As it happens. esti- 
mates of Sri Lanka’s per capita income growth 
show that, during 1960-78, Sri Lanka had a nega- 
tive annual growth rate of - 1.2% along with only 
five other countries including Burundi. Benin 
and Angola! Can it be that the diversion of ex- 
penditures away from growth to (“social”) direct 
expenditures affected growth adversely and 
hence impacted on the poor more than the direct 
expenditures helped them? Or were economic 
policies so bad that growth was affected 
adversely and impacted on the poor. and in- 
creased direct expenditures had to be undertaken 
to offset the adversity for the poor? In short, the 
mediocrity of Sri Lanka’s recent performance on 
the living standards of the poor may be explain- 
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able by hypotheses that only sustain the advisa- 
bility of assigning primacy to the gtotvth-oriented 
route to ameliorating poverty. 
Qf course we can still speculate as to what 
made Sri Lanka in 1949 such an impressive per- 
former on living standards. Was it high growth 
rates or high social expenditures? Was the pro- 
ductivity of the latter high due to specific. man- 
ageable problems such as malaria which could be 
eradicated relatively easily with public-health 
anti-malaria programs and therefore has little 
value in inferring general prescriptions? Only de- 
tailed historical analysis. carefully sifting among 
different hypotheses, can throw light on the issue 
at hand. In the meantime, the ready overopti- 
mism that the early writings on Sri Lanka’s 
postwar experience reflected and spread must be 
suspended. 
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
In the end. therefore. I see no quick fix to our 
immense poverty problem. We can debate 
whether resources can be moved further at the 
margin from the indirect. growth-based route to 
the direct, minimum needs route. But the most 
important lesson seems to be that. wirlzin each 
route, we can and must get significantly more re- 
turns than we have to date. 
Within the indirect route, the New Economic 
Policy initiatives point in the right direction and, 
if successfully brought to fruition, promise a 
significantly greater impact on poverty in the 
next two decades than we have had with our in- 
appropriate policy framework and dismal eco- 
nomic performance. Within the direct route, 
there is continual improvement being sought of 
course and an economist has little expertise to 
offer. Efforts such as integrated, block-level 
development programs and the introduction of 
the village community health workers et al. 
are the fruit of ongoing processes of learning by 
experience: 
time.3’ 
they ought to yield results over 
I have two further thoughts to conclude my lec- 
ture. That our low growth rate seems to have re- 
duced our poverty ratio but left the absolute 
numbers of the poor at an appalling level of over 
300 million, suggests not merely that we must 
pursue doggedly the New Economic Policy initia- 
tives. It also underlines the critical role of a suc- 
cessful population control program. Derailed by 
the draconian measures during the Emergency, 
this program needs to be pushed vigorously if 
the fruits of growth are not to be squandered on 
supporting increasing numbers rather than 
improving the well-being of fewer people. 
At the same time, the political economy con- 
straints on both the indirect and direct routes’ 
ability to reach the poor more effectively, despite 
governmental attempts at offsetting these biases, 
underline the overreaching importance of the 
role of voluntary agencies and social action 
groups. The e.r ante intention of the enlightened 
sectors of our governments will not effectively 
translate in many instances into e.r post outcomes 
in our assault on poverty without the active asso- 
ciation of such agencies. 
These social action groups do not merely aid 
the poor directly but also by acting as watchdogs 
that assist the poor in securing effective access to 
the programs designed by the government for 
their benefit. This is the lesson, for example, of 
the Legal Aid Programme in India where the 
coopting of such agencies has turned out to be an 
essential ingredient in making the program more 
productive. 
Indeed. private and public altruism have, 
therefore. a critically complementary role in 
creating a shared success in the assault on 
poverty. 
NOTES 
1. Such a singular circumstance could be a Myrdai- opportunities. in terms of transfer of assets, training 
type “soft” state or a predatory state; the former would etc., for income expansion. The NREP. on the other 
preclude effective action whereas the latter would hand, creates rural employment to build assets such as 
guarantee malign intervention. roads and therefore can be seen as an attempt at biasing 
the income-expansion process in favor of the poor by 
2. There are two main “anti-poverty” programs in promoting labor-intensive technologies and activities 
India, the Integrated Rural Development Programme and also, insofar as the assets in turn create income dif- 
(IRDP) and the National Rural Employment Pro- ferentially in favor of the poor, via the resulting capital 
gramme (NREP). Both of these are targeted at the formation as well. In practice. however. the asset for- 
poor and would classify as part of the indirect, growth- mation, such as road building, may be negligible as 
based strategy in my typology since thev are intended 
to bias the creation of assets and income’in favor of the 
when the new roads are immediately washed away, re- 
ducing therefore the result in this instance to what it 
poor. Thus, for instance, the IRDP aims at targeting would have been under a transfer payment to the poor 
the poor in the growth process by providing them with as in my direct route. There is, therefore. an extensive 
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debate in India whether the operation of the IRDP and 
NREP programs. while intended as part of the pro- 
poor-bias indirect (growth) strategy. are not defacro re- 
ducing to the pro-poor-bias direct (transfer) strategy. 
On this issue. see the interesting articles by Rath (1985) 
and Sundaram and Tendulkar (1985). I am indebted to 
Sundaram and Tendulkar for drawing my attention to 
these questions. 
. 
3. Here, I refer to economists such as myself, B. S. 
Minhas. K. N. Raj and T. N. Srinivasan who were ac- 
tively involved in planning efforts within institutions 
such as the Indian Planning Commission, and to plan- 
ners such as Pitambar Pant. That some of the purely 
academic development economists were preoccupied 
with models that addressed growth per se, and would 
discover poverty as an explicit target and as an issue for 
analysis many years later, is an observation compatible 
with the fact that some of us at the center of planning 
efforts were not so afflicted. 
4. I have dealt with the growth strategy at much 
greater length in my 7th Sir Purshotam Thakurdas 
Memorial Lecture (Bhagwati. 1987) which should 
therefore be read as a companion piece to the present 
lecture. 
5. See Bhagwati (1958). The model used was devel- 
oped earlier by Johnson (1955) to examine the inter- 
actions between growth and trade. 
6. Such a paradox may be described as implying an 
Invisible Shakedown (by the donor). See Bhagwati, 
Brecher and Hatta (1984). 
7. In economic jargon, one has a case for an opti- 
mum tariff here. Again, later developments in the 
theory of immiserizing growth show how it can be ruled 
out if optimum tariffs are imposed. See Bhagwati 
(1968; 1986c). 
8. On Indian policies with regard to biasing credit 
facilities towards the Door, see Tendulkar’s (1983) ex- 
cellent review. ’ 
9. This graphic comparison and scenario come from 
Myron Weiner’s (1986) interesting analysis of the poli- 
tical economy of India’s appallingly slow growth rate, 
with much of which I am in agreement. I should stress 
that, in using South Korea’s growth rate to make this 
comparison compelling, I do nor mean to imply that we 
could have improved our economic performance quite 
that much! 
IO. Minhas, Jain, Kansal and Saluja (1987). 
1 I. These estimates continue to use the definition of 
poverty line adopted by the Indian Planning Commis- 
sion in the mid-1970s. 
12. These surveys are available on an annual basis 
almost continually up to 1973-74 but only for 1977-78 
and 1983 thereafter. 
13. Many statistical tests have cast continuing doubt 
on the question whether our growth rate has finally 
accelerated in the last decade. All plausible ways of 
splitting the period 1950 to 198-t turn up conclusions 
that suggest unchanged trends. See Bhagwati and Srini- 
vasan (198-l) and Joshi and Little (1986). among other 
analyses of these trends. 
l-1. I have discussed these and other explanations at 
greater length in the 7th Sir Purshotam Thakurdas 
Memorial Lecture (Bhagwati. 1987). 
15. See Pate1 (1986). He is fully aware. of course, that 
the elimination of this system is a goal whereas the 
process will require extremely careful management. 
Whether the growth of interests. supportive of this sys- 
tem, over its existence in the past three decades will 
pose insuperable obstacles to its removal is an issue in 
political economy that I discuss at greater length else- 
where: Bhagwati (1986a. 19S6d. 1987). 
16. This is not the place to report yet again on the 
numerous research projects that showed in the 1960s 
and 1970s how export pessimism had been unjustified 
but had led to dismal export. and in turn to dismal eco- 
nomic, performance in many countries. Useful reviews 
of this research are not available; see Bhagwati (1986b) 
and Balassa (1986). 
17. See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (198-l). 
18. Ibid. 
19. That the interests followed the ideologv and now 
constrain a shift in the ideology is a thesis different 
from that of Professor Pranab Bardhan (1985) who dif- 
fers from me both in starting from the interests and also 
in relating them wholly to public sector losses and 
therewith to slow growth. I have discussed the role of 
public sector savings in India’s slow growth at some 
length in the Sir P.T. Memorial Lecture. again 
emphasizing the early role of ideas and the subsequenr 
role of interests. 
20. Evidence on the relationship of party politics to 
the successful implementation of anti-poverty programs 
have been ably analyzed recently by the Princeton poli- 
tical scientist Atul Kohli (1987). 
21. See Adleman and Morris (1973) and Chenery rf 
al. (1974). In this generic class of strategies. I would 
also include an altogether different kind of proposal 
that I made for Indian planners to consider in 1973 in 
the Lal Bahadur Shastri lectures. I argued for a fractio- 
nal nationalization of land in each village (or similar 
unit), which could be set apart to form a Chinese-style 
commune. Those destitute who wished to follow the 
slow and protracted route offered by the Indian stra- 
tegy of predominantly relying on growth to impact on 
poverty, would take their chances there: but those who 
wished to gain employment and some income right 
away would have immediate access to the commune ri 
la China. The combination of both strategies. and ac- 
cess to either by choice, would mean that the destitute 
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were not forced into the Indian option of freedom but 
slow poverty alleviation of into the Chinese option of 
freedom through forced removal to the communes but 
more rapid and. one hoped, sustained removal of 
abject poverty. 
22. These are hazards that do not seem to have 
afflicted China since the elimination of the kulaks 
seems to have occurred principally during the long civil 
war itself. See Desai (1975). 
23. For a fine review of India’s experience with inter- 
ventions to fill nutritional gaps at the household level. 
see Subbarao (1987). 
2-1. See, for instance. Sundaram (1973). Rosenzweig 
and Schultz (1982). Sen (1984) and Kakwani (1986). 
35. E.g., a successful anti-malaria program may in- 
crease population pressure. reduce real wages. affect 
nutritional intake of the poor and disproportionately 
depress their living standards inclusive of their own life 
expectancy. Economists who like immiserization para- 
doxes on the indirect route should look out for them on 
the direct route as well. 
26. On the other hand, the difficulties of directing the 
expenditures on primary education and health effec- 
tively to the poorer classes when the elites control the 
political system need to be recalled again. Questions 
such as the relative priority attached to primary and 
higher education in state spending and its relationship 
to the class nature of the state have been discussed at 
length by economists such as Samuel Bowles and my- 
self. See the extended analysis in my “Education, Class 
Structure and Income Equality” (1973a). 
27. This observation is also corroborated by the care- 
ful study of the regional variations in the impact of 
India‘s Anti-Poverty programs by Subbarao (1985). 
18. This is evident also from the important in-depth 
analysis of the working of the NREP program in Gu- 
jarat State by Indira Hirway (1986a. 1986b). 
29. This argument was advanced by Isenman (1980) 
and Sen (1981). among others. 
30. The lack of availability of data on changes in 
levels of direct expenditures prevents us from drawing 
more compelling inferences here, as noted by Bhalla 
(1985) himself. Also, such evidence as is available on 
changes in educational expenditures does not help the 
critics of Bhalla either: See Bhalla and Glewwe (1986) 
and the later animated comments by Pyatt (1987) and 
Isenman (1987) and the riposte by Glewwe and Bhalla 
(1987). 
31. See the excellent review of these problems and 
their possible solutions in Lakdawala (1985). based 
on his tenure as Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission. 
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